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Talking to patients about ‘Do Not Attempt Resuscitation’ decisions is difﬁcult for many doctors. Communication about ‘Do
Not Attempt Resuscitation’ decisions should occur as part of a wider discussion of treatment goals at an earlier stage in the
patient’s illness. A doctor should not initiate any treatment, including cardio-pulmonary resuscitation if he/she does not believe
it will beneﬁt the patient. An ethical framework is offered which may be of practical help in clarifying decision-making.
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Doctors and nurses commonly encounter ethical dilemmas
surrounding issues of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and
do not attempt resuscitation (DNAR) decisions. Recent guidelines
from the British Medical Association (BMA), Resuscitation Council
(UK) and the Royal College of Nursing on DNAR decisions are
welcome (British Medical Association et al, 2001). However, they
do not resolve some of the most difﬁcult dilemmas, which relate
to communication issues with patients and their relatives. In this
paper we suggest that communication about DNAR orders may
be improved if they are not seen as separate consultations but
discussed with the patient within the context of treatment plans.
We also consider situations when it is not appropriate to discuss
such decisions with patients and provide an ethical framework to
aid the medical team. Our discussion relates particularly to our
clinical practice with patients in a Cancer Centre, whose prognosis
and aims of treatment vary. Some patients are receiving treatment
with a good prospect of cure or prolonged remission. Others may
be incurable and are receiving palliative treatments with an uncer-
tain prognosis, or may be in a terminal phase where life expectancy
is no more than days.
EXPECTATIONS OF CPR
In the last 30 years CPR has evolved from an intervention devel-
oped to treat the reversible precipitants of sudden death,
indicated only in cases of acute insult to an otherwise healthy
person, to a default measure employed in virtually all cases of
death in hospital (Willard, 2000). Confusion exists, both in the
minds of patients and doctors, between ‘normal death’ and cardio
respiratory arrest. Moreover, an increasing patient expectation of
survival, combined with fears about hospitals and a lack of trust
in doctors, has perhaps contributed to the excessive use of CPR.
Society and the medical profession seem to have forgotten that
death is an integral part of life (Smith, 2000).
A review of the literature reveals that most patients want their
views taken into account in determining their treatment options
but feel that doctors should be the main decision makers (Kerridge
et al, 1998; Downes and Liddle, 2001). With regard to CPR,
patients and relatives lack knowledge of the process involved
(Agard et al, 2000; Brett et al, 2001). To make autonomous judg-
ments patients need better education on CPR outcomes, which
may be achieved by supplementing discussion with written infor-
mation (Kerridge et al, 1999). Respect for autonomy restricts
CPR use when it is refused by the patient but cannot create a ‘right
to CPR’ (Luce, 1995; Hilberman et al, 1997; Willard, 2000).
The poor survival rates documented following in-hospital
cardiac arrests suggests that unsuccessful CPR is common
(Marik and Craft, 1997; De Vos et al, 1999; Rien de Vos et
al, 1999). Such practice may be emotionally fraught and demor-
alising for hospital teams. In the USA, hospital practitioners
fully respect patient autonomy by seeking the patient’s or surro-
gate’s consent in every instance. However such an approach
grants doctors no authority to refuse to render treatments that
are in their judgments contraindicated (Mello and Jenkinson,
1998). This practice can be contrasted with that found in the
UK, where practices vary depending on the patient’s situation.
For example, in general, CPR is not carried out in hospices
or at home, whereas DNAR decisions are routinely considered
in general and oncology wards although they may not be
discussed with the patient (Willard, 2000). Thus doctors in
the UK are enabled to reduce the inappropriate use of resusci-
tation, but at the expense of patient autonomy (Mello and
Jenkinson, 1998).
GUIDELINES
Locally agreed policies on CPR and DNAR decisions are necessary
to enhance clinical care, to respect the autonomy and dignity of
patients and to protect individual doctors and nurses from criti-
cism. The recent BMA, Resuscitation Council and RCN
guidelines are helpful in that they ‘outline legal and ethical stan-
dards for planning patient care and decision-making in relation
to cardiopulmonary resuscitation’ (British Medical Association et
al, 2001). They aim to demystify the process by which decisions
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COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS
Talking about DNAR decisions with patients and relatives is not
easy. Doctors may lack the necessary communication skills and
may feel a sense of failure or fear litigation. They may worry that
the patient will be distressed by the discussion. Another difﬁculty
for doctors is that the discussion usually takes place when CPR
is being withdrawn as a treatment option. There is also the ques-
tion as to which doctor in the team should discuss these issues
with the patient and their relatives. This question relates not just
to the seniority or experience of the physician but also to their
communication skills and availability. Communication about these
complex issues should be viewed as a process, which may not be
completed in a single consultation. Patient recall of DNAR discus-
sions may be poor and doctors need to be aware of the need to
give patients an opportunity to review their decision if they so wish
(Stewart and Spice, 2001).
IMPROVING THE COMMUNICATION OF
DNAR DECISIONS
Recent guidelines aim to demystify the process of DNAR orders for
patients and to promote trust (British Medical Association et al,
2001). The decision-making guidelines also recommend ‘advanced
planning for anticipated medical events’ (British Medical Associa-
tion et al, 2001). We propose that if DNAR discussions took place
within the context of discussions around aims of treatment at earlier
hospital admissions, for example for chemotherapy or treatment of
neutropenic sepsis, some patients would then have opportunities to
discuss CPR at a time when it was considered an appropriate option.
As disease progresses, the opportunity to discuss changing aims of
treatment, quality of life issues and expectations of the future should
be taken in order to facilitate understanding and acceptance of a
DNAR order when this becomes appropriate.
The critical issues in improving communication around DNAR
orders lie in the timing of the discussion and in ensuring that
the conversation relating to CPR forms part of a wider range of
negotiations, which explain the aims of care. In this way, the
patient gains insight and understanding that their disease is
progressing. They come to appreciate that the goals of care are
now comfort, improving quality of life and maintaining dignity.
Consequently they understand that interventions such as surgery,
chemotherapy or CPR are no longer appropriate.
It is clear that many patients and relatives do not understand the
nature of CPR and DNAR orders (Agard et al, 2000; Brett et al,
2001). It is important to explain that this technique evolved in
response to sudden cardiac arrest rather than as an intervention
to be used in advanced cancer. It is also important to stress the
supportive care the medical teams do feel is appropriate e.g. intra-
venous (i.v.) antibiotics for sepsis, i.v. hydration and optimal
symptom control. This should be documented in the patient’s
notes alongside the DNAR order. Otherwise, patients and their
relatives may fear that a DNAR order will adversely affect the qual-
ity of their care (Ebrahim, 2000). It is the doctor’s responsibility to
ensure this is never the case.
Although relatives have no legal right to make decisions for
another adult, staff should be available to discuss and explain the
reasons why a DNAR decision would be appropriate to protect
an individual from unhelpful and potentially undigniﬁed treatment
and also to explain that all other treatments to ensure the comfort
and dignity of the patient would still be carried out (Luce, 1995).
As DNAR discussions became more commonplace, we would
hope that less experienced doctors would be trained in the neces-
sary communication techniques and the palliative care team would
have an educational role here. Our experience is that the hospital
palliative care teams could also be involved at the oncology –
palliative care interface when such discussions take place and their
role would be to support the patient, family and health profes-
sionals involved. Occasionally, it may even be appropriate for the
palliative care team to initiate the discussion with the patient
and to convey the outcome to the oncology team., However, we
have identiﬁed key practical difﬁculties, which are not addressed
by published guidelines:
. The patient demands CPR when the medical team feel it would
not be beneﬁcial
. The role of the family
. Notions of futility
THE PATIENT DEMANDS CPR
The guidelines do not clarify what the doctor should do if the
patient refuses a DNAR order (British Medical Association et al,
2001). Can a doctor be compelled to offer a treatment, which he
or she feels, will not beneﬁt a patient? It is generally accepted that
doctors have no legal obligation to offer any treatment, which in
their professional judgment will not be beneﬁcial (Luce, 1995).
However, the guidelines are ambiguous, stating that ‘doctors
cannot be required to give treatment contrary to their clinical judg-
ment but should, whenever possible, respect patients’ wishes to
receive treatment which carries only a very small chance of success
or beneﬁt’ (British Medical Association et al, 2001). Perhaps it is
the fear of having a patient refuse a DNAR order that causes
doctors to delay discussions until the patient is dying, when he/
she may be unable to participate in decision-making. Doctors need
to be able to discuss with patients that a treatment is not appropri-
ate when it is unlikely to confer beneﬁt or when it is likely to cause
more harm than good. Refusing a treatment may be difﬁcult for
doctors particularly when it may appear that ‘life is at stake’.
However, in patients with advanced cancer, successful CPR rarely
prolongs life for more than a short time, and does not improve
its quality. Attempting CPR in such situations is medically inap-
propriate and promotes the myth that doctors can postpone
death indeﬁnitely. In our experience, given time and the opportu-
nity for discussions, it is extremely rare for a patient to continue to
insist on attempts at resuscitation.
THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY
When the patient is no longer competent to make decisions, the
family is involved in discussions and they may have strong views
as to whether resuscitation should, or should not, be attempted.
The guidelines make it clear that when doctors are talking to the
family, they are seeking clariﬁcation of what the patient would have
wished for, rather than what the relatives themselves would wish.
Many relatives do not share this perception and feel that they have
a right to decide whether to consent to or refuse CPR. This can
lead to conﬂict with the medical staff or leave relatives with feelings
of guilt in bereavement.
NOTIONS OF FUTILITY
Notions of the futility of CPR risk obscuring the decision-making
process. Clearly, if the patient were dying from a terminal illness,
CPR would be futile and inappropriate. (Ebell, 1992; Marik and
Craft, 1997; Ebell et al, 1998; De Vos et al, 1999; Gwinnutt et al,
2000). Notions of futility are centred on whether CPR is likely to
be successful. It is more helpful for the doctor to make a judgment
about whether successful CPR is likely to beneﬁt the patient. Such
judgment would need to take into account whether the patient is
likely to achieve a level of recovery, which justiﬁes the potential
burdens of the treatment.
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INTERPROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION
DNAR decisions should be recorded in the medical notes in a
manner that reﬂects the professional’s respect for the patient’s
dignity. It should be noted that there has been a clinical assessment
by a senior clinician (consultant or registrar) with responsibility for
the patient’s care and that attempts at resuscitation would not
beneﬁt the patient. The note should include the nature of the
discussion with the patient and the family, the diagnosis, the time,
the date of review, the date the order was made and the signature
of the responsible physician. If such discussion was either not
appropriate or possible the reasons for this must be stated (Box 1).
Any form of jargon or medical shorthand is totally unacceptable.
The decision must be shared between the medical and nursing
teams. Procedures within teams for making decisions should be
clear and the views of the whole team need to be explored (British
Medical Association et al, 2001). It is helpful if both medical and
nursing staff can be present when discussing these issues with the
patient.
Just as a signed consent form is an acknowledgement that a
process of informed consent has taken place, so too the documen-
tation in the notes of a DNAR order should be a record that the
process of decision-making has been carried out in the appropriate
way.
We think that there are many beneﬁts of improving communi-
cation in this way. Perhaps the most important is that full
informed consent is achieved for the DNAR order; although it is
unusual to obtain informed consent for a treatment being with-
held. The result is a more open and honest relationship with the
patient and their family. All parties, including on-call medical
teams, are made aware of aims of treatment and measures that
are still felt to be appropriate.
A MODEL FOR ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING AROUND
DNAR ORDERS
A new way of approaching the issue of DNAR orders brings CPR
into the everyday discussion with the patient while they are compe-
tent but as the disease progresses, and the likely beneﬁt of CPR
becomes negligible, the ethical case for the doctor taking the
responsibility for the decision becomes stronger.
In thinking about ethical dilemmas the principles of the duties
of respect for autonomy, beneﬁcence, non-maleﬁcence and justice
are useful (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994). In a clinical situation
these duties often conﬂict and Figure 1 illustrates a way in which
the ethical duties might be given differing weights in differing clin-
ical situations and may clarify decision-making. Doctors must
ensure that each patient is considered as an individual.
DISCUSSION
Is it ever ethical not to discuss a DNAR decision with a competent
patient? Whilst there is a strong ethical presumption in favour of
discussing treatment decisions with patients, DNAR is a ‘withhold-
ing of treatment’ so requires special attention. If, in the judgment
of the senior doctor, the patient may beneﬁt from CPR then it is
mandatory to discuss this with the patient. If however, in the
doctor’s professional judgment, CPR would not beneﬁt the patient,
as a consequence of the severity of their underlying clinical condi-
tion, and the doctor feels that the harm of discussion outweigh the
beneﬁts, then there is no legal or moral imperative to discuss CPR
with the patient (Luce, 1995; Dunphy, 2000).
Although generally we would advocate earlier discussion about
CPR with competent patients, in dying patients, a DNAR decision
may be made by the responsible consultant without the competent
patient’s involvement (Downes and Liddle, 2001). However,
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CPR confers potential benefit
Full discussion with patient
(and their relatives if they wish)
Proceed with CPR unless patient
refuses
Competent patient
CPR confers no benefit
Discuss CPR as part of realistic
treatment plan
(if patient wants discussion)
DNAR decision
Incompetent patient
CPR confers potential benefit
Discuss with relatives to ascertain
patient's views in past
Proceed with CPR – unless valid
advance directive to the contrary
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CPR confers no benefit
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and nursing team
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Figure 1 An ethical approach to DNAR decision-making.
Box 1 An example of a DNAR order
Patient’s name: Ann Other
Diagnosis: Carcinoma of ovary; liver and lung metastases
On the basis of a clinical assessment and after a full discussion with Ann it has been
agreed that there should be no attempt at cardio-pulmonary resuscitation in the
event of a cardiac arrest.
NOT FOR CARDIO PULMONARY RESUSCITATION
Reason Advanced widespread malignancy
Review Next consultant round 17.1.01
Date 12.1.01
Signed (consultant oncologist)
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patient for other reasons; fear of causing distress, fear of refusal
of a DNAR order; conﬂict with the family and confusion surround-
ing futility. In such cases where it would be appropriate to have
discussions with the patient, doctors may be more likely to discuss
CPR and DNAR issues if they have become accustomed to the
discussion and if they have received appropriate communication
skills teaching. Even so, some decisions will be difﬁcult and may
result in conﬂict between doctors and patients, doctors and the
family or between professionals. In such situations our experience
is that the support of the specialist palliative care team may be
of value.
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